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in an Era of Strategic Expansions
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ABSTR ACT: The June 2020 clash between the People’s Republic of China
and India in the disputed Ladakh border area resulted from the strategic
expansions of both powers. Like two bubbles expanding in a contained space,
these expansions were bound to collide and cause friction. This article explains
how the expansions precipitated the incident and might exacerbate border
disputes in the future. In pondering implications, it recommends Washington
pursue a Eurasia-focused policy embracing the disputed region.

O

n June 15, 2020, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian
troops engaged in a fight using fists and clubs close to Patrol Point
14 in the Galwan Valley in the disputed border area of Ladakh
in the Himalayas. At least 20 Indian and 45 Chinese soldiers died in the
clashes. According to Indian reports, PRC forces crossed the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) that separates India-administered Jammu and Kashmir from
PRC-administered Aksai Chin.1 Beijing and Delhi claim these territories
in parts or entirety and blamed each other for the incident, the first deadly
clash since 1975.2 The skirmish did not involve the use of firearms, which the
powers banned in previous years. Despite an agreement to disengage, and a
previous record of withdrawal after similar clashes, the situation has not returned
to the status quo ante.3
Analysis of the strategic expansions of both powers reveals the larger dynamics
which arguably made the June 15 incident inevitable. A strategic expansion
involves policies and measures aimed at extending a state’s political, economic,
and military influence or control within and outside its borders. Such policies and
activities are interconnected and mutually reinforcing but are harder to implement
in a region riddled with border disputes. The PRC and India are both pursuing
1. “A Border Dispute between India and China Is Getting More Serious,” Economist, May 28, 2020,
https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/05/28/a-border-dispute-between-india-and-china-is-getting-more-serious.
2. Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations,
June 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-india-border-dispute-what-know?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4IOj6K7c
6gIVkgiICR1AJwmLEAAYASAAEgL-dfD_BwE.
3. Special Correspondent, “LAC Standoff: India, China Hold Fourth Round of Consultations,” Hindu,
July 14, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-indian-and-chinese-commanders-hold-talks
-on-further-disengagement-in-eastern-ladakh/article32076879.ece; Nick Reynolds and Sidharth Kaushal, “A Military
Analysis of the Sino–Indian Border Clashes,” RUSI, June 2, 2020, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research
/publications/commentary/military-analysis-sino–indian-border-clashes; and Rajesh Roy, “India-China Border
Standoff Turns Violent, with 20 Indian Soldiers Dead,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com
/articles/india-china-border-dispute-turns-deadly-11592305962.
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strategic expansion policies focused on the disputed Ladakh region and
deploying capabilities to shape their geopolitical environments and facilitate their
ongoing rise as great powers. The incident and the dispute thus represent the
focal points at which the powers’ strategic expansions interact. In this case,
it does not matter whether the incident was a provocation or an accident,
as the conflict’s geopolitical premise rooted in the strategic expansions connotes
a degree of inevitability.

Figure 1. Map of disputed borders and territory in the Himalayas
(Map courtesy of REUTERS Graphics) 4

The notion of strategic expansion is especially illuminating in the context
of the border dispute because India and China share the perception that each
is a victim of exploitation by foreign powers; each also desires to remedy this
legacy. As two of the world’s oldest civilizations, both countries seek to regain
a status befitting their size, population, and heritage; thus, each places
considerable value on “territory, past wrongs and restitution.”5 The “century
of national humiliation” in China and the colonization and partition of India
reinforce this commitment, with both powers seeking to reconstitute the
areas they once controlled and do so within perceived borders so as to right
the supposed wrongs caused by outside actors.6 The related efforts foster
an environment conducive to border conflicts, as conceptions of “inherent
4. Alyssa Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages to India,” Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations,
September 17, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-mixed-messages-india. Adapted by the authors.
5. Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2011), 28.
6. John Garver, “The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation,” China Report 47, no. 2,
(2011): 103, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000944551104700204; Shreya Das, The Sino-Indian
Border Dispute: What Role for the European Union? (briefing paper, European Institute for Asian Studies,
2014), https://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EIAS_Briefing_Paper_2014-2_Das.pdf; and Manjari
Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2013), 110.
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historical and contemporary greatness” are difficult to reconcile in the case of
the contested borders.7
The latest border incident has implications for global security,
Sino-Indian-Pakistani ties, and the United States, which has been retreating
from its global security role over the past few years while increasingly directing
its capabilities toward containing the PRC. Having never developed a robust
Eurasia-focused policy featuring the Ladakh region, the United States’
ability to formulate a response to the incident has been limited. The strategic
expansions of the PRC and India into the disputed Ladakh region (on a micro
level encompassing political, economic, and military expansions) also have a
bearing on America’s role as a guarantor of global security, which has hinged
on its efforts to connect excluded regions to the international system.8 To shape
the strategic expansions of the PRC and India, the United States must develop
a policy with a focus on Central and South Asia strategies. Only then can it
maintain its role as a global security guarantor in a world order increasingly
influenced by the rise of Asian great powers.

Political Expansion
For India and the PRC, political expansion into the disputed border
region of Ladakh refers to an elevated focus on policy making regarding the
region at both national and local levels; promotion of the nations’ capacities
to control local administrations in the territories under their de facto control
by appointing and removing local officials and managing or setting local and
trans-regional policy agendas; and actions by the governments to redefine or
adjust the political and administrative status of the controlled territories in the
disputed region.
In the case of the PRC, political expansion refers to the extension
of political influence from the center of the country to its periphery in
service of the “Chinese dream.” 9 Beijing defines the dream as achieving a
“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by restoring its preeminence and
7. David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52,
no. 1 (February–March 2010): 137, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396331003612513?
journalCode=tsur20&; Garver, “Unresolved Sino–Indian Border”; Tsering Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet
Issue in the Sino–Indian Border Dispute,” China Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 116, https://journals.sagepub.com
/doi/10.1177/000944551104700205; and Brahma Chellaney, “Coming Water Wars: Beware the Future,”
International Economy (Fall 2009): 38, https://www.international-economy.com/TIE_F09_Chellaney.pdf.
8. See Roman Muzalevsky, China’s Rise and Reconfiguration of Central Asia’s Geopolitics: A Case for U.S.
“Pivot” to Eurasia (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2015), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu
/pubs/2351.pdf.
9. Patricia Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion,” Pacific Council on International Policy,
September 19, 2019, https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/understanding-china%E2%80%99s-military
-expansion.
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making it a “fully-developed great power by 2049.” 10 Political expansion
supports this “dream” by advancing and consolidating institutions of
political and administrative control in peripheral, culturally different, and
autonomous areas exhibiting separatist tendencies. The PRC exerts control
over the political, cultural, and economic development agendas in these
areas, making them adhere to the party’s core values, beliefs, policies, and
strategic vision. Xinjiang and Tibet, bordering Ladakh and Aksai Chin,
are examples which elucidate Beijing’s sensitivities (and India’s for that
matter) when viewed through the prism of the incident and its
strategic expansion.
On the one hand, China’s political expansion is an organic process.
Beijing now has the capability to extend its political control to areas
beyond the “Han core,” something it had struggled with after incorporating
Tibet and Xinjiang in 1949.11 Various threats and challenges also limited
maneuverability in advancing national sovereignty claims during the
Cold War.12 On the other hand, aspects of the expansion are a directed
process.This process has developed because Beijing is pursuing a balanced
and secure national economic development by shrinking the gap between
the prosperous eastern and poor western regions while building a secure
base to project power on its western flank. This dual imperative is critical
for the security of the PRC, which perceives advancing separatist forces
along its entire frontier from inner Mongolia in the north and Taiwan
and Hong Kong in the southeast to Tibet and Xingjian in the northwest.
This task is projected to grow in importance as economic growth slows
and the elite look for new sources of economic growth, legitimacy,
and power.
The perceived US efforts to foment separatism and contain Chinese
expansion in the Indo-Asia-Pacific make the western flank even more
important to Beijing’s grand strategy. These efforts also make the PRC
less restrained regarding its territorial and sovereignty claims. Chinese
actions in the disputed region include aims to change India’s strategic calculus
regarding Delhi’s unfulfilled role of a counterbalance, push for a
reinterpretation of the LAC, and deter India’s regional expansion while
securing its own. India’s territorial constitutional changes in August 2019
10. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
11. M. Taylor Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes,”
International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 83, www.jstor.org/stable/30130518.
12. Aldo D. Abitol, “Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War: A Systems Level Approach,” Josef Korbel Journal
of Advanced International Studies (Summer 2009): 82, https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1000&context=advancedintlstudies; and Zhihua Shen and Julia Lovell, “Undesired Outcomes: China’s
Approach to Border Disputes during the Early Cold War,” Cold War History 15, no. 1 (2015): 89–111, https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2014.932350.
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and military expansion in the disputed areas have only reinforced
Beijing’s negative perception of India’s territorial claims over Ladakh,
Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh. 13 The country’s political expansion has
aggravated India’s insecurity, prompting a race for political control in the
region, which exacerbated the dispute and culminated in the incident.
Similarly, India’s concerns about its sovereignty and China’s territorial
claims drive its political expansion. At the heart of India’s concerns are
power asymmetry vis-à-vis the PRC on the Tibet issue, the border disputes,
and nuclear capabilities. Delhi considers Tibet a contested buffer state
with geopolitical benefits.14 The region contains 40 percent of the PRC’s
mineral resources and the world’s third-largest freshwater repository.15 It
also provides nations controlling it with major advantages to project power
toward the border with India or the rest of the China.16 Border tensions are
exacerbated by the construction of dams on the rivers originating in Tibet
as well as the regional expansions of both powers.17 Beijing’s resistance to
Delhi’s interpretation of the McMahon Line as India’s northeastern border
with Tibet further aggravates the border disputes.18
Like the PRC in Xinjiang and Tibet, India is extending its political
influence in the Muslim-dominated Jammu and Kashmir regions by
resorting to nationalism, which has become a more potent force under the
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party since it gained control of the administration
in 2014. 19 In 2019, India’s Hindu nationalist government stripped Jammu
and Kashmir of its status as an Indian state, breaking it into two territories
directly governed by New Delhi.20 It also divided its eastern Ladakh
region into a separate union territory. India’s minister of internal affairs
then reaffirmed India’s claim to Aksai Chin by stating “we are ready to give

13. Chaowu Dai, “China’s Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962,” Asian Perspective 43,
no. 3 (2019): 435–57, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2282990224/fulltextPDF/2C0ED2E7291C4EE6PQ
/1?accountid=41510.
14. Chellaney, “Coming Water Wars,” 38; and Malone and Mukherjee, “India and China,” 137–58.
15. Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?,” WIREs Water 3 (March/April
2016): 155–66, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/wat2.1123.
16. Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet Issue,” 119.
17. Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages”; Manuel Vermeer, “War over Water? Tibet, the Sino-Indian Power
Play and Potential Consequences for Asia,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security,
no. 432 (July 2016), https://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/432_Vermeer.pdf; Das, Sino-Indian
Border Dispute, 9; and Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s Worrying Border Infrastructure Deficit,” Diplomat,
June 19, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/indias-worrying-border-infrastructure-deficit/.
18. Abitol, “1962 Sino-Indian War.”
19. Dai, “China’s Strategy.”
20. Zeba Siddiqui and Fayaz Bukhari, “India, China Clash over Kashmir as It Loses Special Status and
Is Divided,” Reuters, October 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir/india-PRC-clash
-over-kashmir-as-it-loses-special-status-and-is-divided-idUSKBN1XA0M9.
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our lives for [Aksai Chin].”21 Beijing almost certainly factored this statement
in any decision to initiate or respond to the actions along the LAC.
Since the regional balance of forces favors China and Pakistan, India views
the extension of its political influence in the north as necessary to secure
its northern flank while also challenging the PRC’s assertive engagement
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. To that end, India has sought to enhance its
engagement with Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal. Its perceived need to catch
up has in turn elevated Beijing’s security concerns, making incidents such
as the June 15 clash more likely. Sino-Indian and Pakistani-Indian border
disputes are dangerous because their unstable interdependence, marked by
trilateral perceptions and unequal capabilities, lends itself to a possible armed
confrontation involving not two but three nuclear armed states.
Economic Expansion
The economic expansion of both powers refers to the promotion of
economic and development policies in and beyond the disputed border
region of Ladakh. Unlike political expansion, which focuses on domestic
development within a perceived geopolitical space, economic expansion has
a pronounced transregional component supporting the countries’ internal
and external expansion. Importantly, the expansion in both cases is meant to
shore up state legitimacy, communist or nationalist rule, and the countries’
nationalist economic agendas.22 These agendas eventually collide in domestic
and regional environments, accentuating the border disputes amid the spike
in regional economic infrastructure development. The expansions thus serve
as sources of tension that spill into border conflicts. Defining how these
expansions interact is key to ensuring a smoother reconfiguration of the
Western-led global economic order to one potentially dominated by Asian
powers in the coming decades.23
To fuel its global economic expansion, the PRC uses the Belt and Road
Initiative, which entails more than $1 trillion in infrastructure investments
in more than 60 countries (including the regions disputed with India).24 The
initiative’s maritime and land components are linked by the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor, which facilitates Beijing’s Western Development Strategy.
21. Press Trust of India, “PoK, Aksai Chin Part of J&K; Will Give Life for It: Amit Shah in Lok Sabha,”
Business Standard, December 5, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/pok-aksai-chin
-part-of-jk-will-give-life-for-it-shah-in-ls-119080600532_1.html.
22. Malone and Mukherjee, “India and China.”
23. Roman Muzalevsky, Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics (Carlisle,
PA: US Army War College Press, 2017), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3362.pdf.
24. Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign
Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
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India increasingly views the PRC’s economic expansion in the border region
as incompatible with its own, not least due to a growing trade imbalance.
India has not joined the Belt and Road Initiative, which has also raised
concerns about Beijing’s agenda in Myanmar, Nepal, and even Pakistan.25
India has been apprehensive about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
because it passes west of the Daulat Beg Oldie military base via the GilgitBaltistan region, which is disputed by Delhi and Islamabad, and because it
legitimizes Pakistan and China’s political and economic expansions. Prior
to the border incident, Delhi directed domestic companies “to avoid using
Chinese equipment to upgrade the 4G networks.” 26 Following the border
clash, and amid growing economic tensions in the bilateral relationship, it
banned the use of Chinese applications and is considering further restrictions
on the use of Chinese telecommunications equipment.27 The economic
tensions against the backdrop of the political expansions in the contested
areas serve to increase misperceptions and prospects of border incidents.28
Augmented by the powers’ economic expansions in each other’s recognized
and disputed areas, the economic tensions contributed to the border clash—
which, in turn, brought the tensions to a new level.
As Beijing advances economic policies in the southwest and northwest,
Delhi leverages its Connect Central Asia policy to redefine the northern
periphery and match these economic advances. Several major factors, however,
constrain the policy. India has outlined a plan for developing and integrating
the union territories with the rest of India, but the disputed region features
mountainous terrain and high altitudes, making economic activities difficult
to organize and sustain. India also has no border with Afghanistan and
would have to rely on Pakistan to unleash the full potential of its regional
and transregional economic policies. Finally, India’s economy is $10 trillion
smaller than China’s economy and could fall further behind absent major
reforms.29 Still, Delhi continues to press forward with economic expansion
in the region while strengthening economic, political, and military ties
with countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, especially Australia, Japan,
Vietnam, and the United States.
25. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
26. Tridivesh Singh Maini, China, India and the Galwan Valley Clashes: What Can India Do? (strategic
analysis paper, Future Directions International, 2020), https://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/china
-india-and-the-galwan-valley-clashes-what-can-india-do/.
27. Rajesh Roy and Shan Li, “India Bans TikTok, Dozens of Other Chinese Apps after Border Clash,”
Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-blocks-dozens-of-chinese-apps
-including-tiktok-following-border-clash-11593447321; and Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages.”
28. Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in
-himalayas-sino-indian-border-confrontation-pub-81979.
29. Walter Russell Mead, “India Is a Natural U.S. Ally in the New Cold War,” Wall Street Journal,
May 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-is-a-natural-u-s-ally-in-the-new-cold-war-11590600011.
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Military Expansion
For both countries, military expansion refers to a greater focus on
military planning regarding the disputed border area of Ladakh and
competing territorial claims, the development of military infrastructure,
and the deployment of enhanced military capabilities in the region. These
expansions stem from the comprehensive military buildups both powers
have been pursuing over the past decade.
China’s military expansion is meant to help the country become a
world-class military by 2050, enabling it to protect its expanding economic
interests, including those in Central and South Asia. 30 Beijing views
Ladakh as an inalienable historical territory it must defend to protect
its economic expansion while preventing India’s expansion north and
perceived US encroachment in the east. As a result, the PRC is reevaluating
its “Active Defense” approach, seeking to preempt threats of attacks—not
just attacks—along its perimeter to deter opponents. 31 Its military planners
are also paying more attention to the southwest region and to India. 32
In recent years, Beijing has significantly upgraded military infrastructure
in the disputed region. 33 It has built 58,000 kilometers of railway and road
systems, five air bases, and supply hubs across Tibet to improve rapid
reaction and counterterrorism capabilities. 34 The network links to several
major highways crisscrossing the country—Central Highway, Eastern
Highway, Yunnan-Tibet Highway, and Western Highway—and is further
connected to the PRC-Pakistan Karakoram Highway and the disputed
Aksai Chin region. Aksai Chin is controlled by China and separated from
Indian-administered areas of the disputed Ladakh by the LAC. Many of
the network’s roads run close to or beyond the LAC—areas India considers
its territory. To improve military deployments, the Chinese have also
extended rail lines close to the Indian border. 35
During the border conflict with India on June 15, the PRC likely
occupied multiple new geographic positions to ensure greater protection
of the China National Highway 219 (G219) linking Xinjiang and Tibet
and the China National Highway 314 (G314) connecting China to
30. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
31. See M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2019).
32. Antara Ghosal Singh, “What Is China Saying about the China-India Border Stand-Off?,” Diplomat,
June 2, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-is-china-saying-about-the-china-india-border-stand-off/.
33. Shivangi Borah, “Behind Doklam Lies an Uneven Infrastructure Race between China and India,”
New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, no. 14 (Fall 2017), https://www.csis.org/npfp/behind-doklam-lies-an
-uneven-infrastructure-race-between-china-and-india; and Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages.”
34. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
35. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
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Pakistan.36 It may have also done so to prevent India from building its own
infrastructure and using “the 255 km Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie
road.”37 Completed in 2019, this road allows for rapid military deployment
to the LAC. 38 India’s construction of offshoot roads may have aggravated
Beijing’s concerns, triggering the alleged incursions.39 The PRC then used
the territorial gains as “a form of coercive issue linkage,” pressuring India
on the “disputed territories to secure concessions” on border-related or
non-border–related issues in other geographic areas.40 China could thus be
looking to pressure India to stay away from Nepal and roadbuilding in the
eastern sector to prevent Delhi from expanding its influence there. 41 The
disengagement, which has involved only select positions abandoned by the
Chinese since the clash of June 15, lends credence to this argument.
While India’s regional military expansion has proceeded more slowly
than China’s, many projects have been coming online over the past two
years, unnerving Beijing.42 India has completed the construction of most
of the 73 roads under the “India-China Border Roads initiative.”43 The
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road now enables Delhi to move
military assets close to the contested areas along the LAC—a key change
considering the People’s Liberation Army’s own rapid deployment
capacity. 44 India’s military was long focused on “insurgency in Kashmir and
the Naxalite uprising,” leaving it vulnerable to perceived military threats
from China. The PRC’s recent military expansion in Xinjiang, Tibet, and
the south has prompted Delhi to increase “manpower for the [country’s]
Indo-Tibetan Border Police,” to strengthen the capabilities of its “Eastern
Air Command,” and “expand [its] air bases” in the region.45
In upgrading its military potential, India has increased the capabilities
of its “airmobile 17 Mountain Strike Corps.”46 Once it completes its
military modernization, India could deploy more forces near its border with

36. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
37. Marcelo Duhalde, Dennis Wong, and Kaliz Lee, “India-China Border Clash Explained,” South China
Morning Post, July 2, 2020, https://multimedia.scmp.com/infographics/news/world/article/3091480/ChinaIndia-border-dispute/index.html.
38. Duhalde, Wong, and Lee, “India-China Border Clash.”
39. “Border Dispute between India and China”; and Derek Grossman, “Chinese Border Aggression against
India Likely Unrelated to Pandemic,” Diplomat (blog), RAND, July 6, 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07
/chinese-border-aggression-against-india-likely-unrelated.html.
40. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
41. Singh, “China-India Border Stand-Off?”
42. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
43. Borah, “Behind Doklam,” 40.
44. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
45. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
46. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
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the PRC, whose troops are mostly positioned deeper inland.47 The PRC
may have initially sought to alter the status quo in the Galwan Valley by
gaining whatever military advantages it could (in complex terrain) in the
areas it now controls.48 After all, India’s military expansion into Ladakh could
enable it to sustain forward deployment closer to the PRC’s borders, thereby
eroding some of the PRC’s advantages.49 Pointedly, Colonel Zhang Shuili,
a spokesperson for the Chinese military’s Western Theater Command, said
the PRC had always maintained sovereignty over the Galwan Valley, despite
retreating from the area after a war with India in 1962.50
India’s regional military expansion and attempts to match the PRC
in military infrastructure building are predicated on a need to protect
itself in a two-front war. The result is an unstable “arms race” dynamic
prone to miscalculations of intent and capabilities in the conditions of
a security dilemma. 51 India’s relatively more acute threat perceptions,
as well as a sense of injury and resentment against the PRC, exacerbate
this dilemma.52 With both powers now possessing the capacity to wage
large-scale war in the disputed area, this dynamic is even more menacing in
terms of its risks and implications.

Implications
For decades, the western frontiers of the PRC and the northern frontiers
of India were out of reach for both countries, but now ongoing expansions
are threatening the status quo. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
disputed Ladakh, where both nations are expected to act more assertively
as their strategic expansions leave them less room to maneuver. Absent a
mutually agreed-upon modus operandi, the powers risk raising the bar of
acceptable levels of violence—a dangerous prospect considering their status
as nuclear-armed states. The region’s terrain will influence decisions to
initiate, sustain, freeze, or end a confrontation. A conventional or nuclear
confrontation is not inconceivable and awareness of the risks might facilitate
47. Frank O’Donnell, Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security Relations: Managing the Strategic Rivalry after Doklam
(paper, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/21
/stabilizing-sino-indian-security-relations-managing-strategic-rivaly-after-doklam-pub-76622.
48. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis”; and Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas.”
49. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
50. Niharika Mandhana, Rajesh Roy, and Chun Han Wong, “The Deadly India-China Clash: Spiked Clubs and
Fists at 14,000 Feet,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/spiked-clubs-and-fists-at
-14-000-feet-the-deadly-india-china-clash-11592418242; and “Border Dispute between India and China.”
51. Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 141;
and Abitol, “1962 Sino-Indian War,” 76.
52. Tien-sze Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2013), https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198095958.001.0001/acprof-9780198095958;
Neville Maxwell, “Why the Sino–Indian Border Dispute Is Still Unresolved after 50 Years: A Recapitulation,”
China Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 71–82, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/000944551104700202; and
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a more effective mechanism to manage the border tensions. Both parties should
signal clear intentions and avoid misperception traps that could invite further
provocations and land grabbing. These actions are critical because both countries
operate in dissimilar political environments and differ in their abilities to control
national sentiment during conflict.
The border incident and conflict will prompt the PRC and India to adjust
regional military balances and relations with neighboring countries, foreign
powers, and institutions in response to each other’s regional advances. Both
will likely increase defense spending in the Ladakh region and adjoining areas,
partially as an extension of growing military spending trends. Both will also
boost engagement with neighbors along the shared perimeter to secure political,
economic, and military advantages. Finally, both will reexamine their roles in
multilateral institutions and adjust their relationships with regional and global
powers to balance each other’s strategic expansions.
The United States may try to use the border conflict to draw India into a
strategic alliance explicitly opposing the PRC. India is unlikely to embrace the
idea, instead positioning itself as an independent and self-sufficient power,
drawing on its growing capabilities and historical legacy as a nonaligned
movement leader during the Cold War. At that time, Delhi faced a choice of
aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union but chose to chart
its own path and, just like Beijing, has treated the dispute on a bilateral basis.
India appears wary of causing misperceptions in the PRC’s calculus regarding a
strategic partnership with Washington and is likely to opt for a soft balancing.53
Yet, India’s foreign policy approach, rooted in strategic autonomy, is becoming
“more nuanced, more flexible and adaptable” as it comes increasingly under
strain “because of the rise of a realist strand of thinking” driven by the rise of the
PRC.54 This strain presents an opening for the United States to pursue a strategic
relationship with India and provides a counterbalance to China’s advances in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific and beyond. Ultimately, the United States should develop
a robust policy on Ladakh involving a series of economic, political, and military
initiatives in Central and South Asia. This approach will help Washington
influence the strategic expansions of both powers while serving as a credible global
security guarantor and integrator in the increasingly changing world order.
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